Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1989

Utah Department of Transportation v. Laygo
Company, et al., J. D. Springer : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Tex R. Olsen; Ken Chamberlain; Kay L. McIff; Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Alan S. Bachman; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah Department of Transportation v. Laygo Company, No. 890173.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2551

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

J1AH
<

,S9
DOCKET NC
1 III! I

1 J: I Il -' I! ill IJI 1: I; Il III! I Il: J < ; 1 Ill I!: L I Il,111 "! IJI
• - — -OOOOC )

1 11: II II; .II S I I I I i I

OP UTAH

'

UTAH DEPARTMEN I C 11?
TRANSPORTATION
Plaintiff Appe."
vs

KU73

LAYGO COMPANY r c it 5 J ,
J. D. SPRINGER,
Defendants-Respondents
A

OQ-

—-oo0<
'•

*»£V

'

T e x R. C

leral

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 890173
LAYGO COMPANY, et al.,
J. D. SPRINGER,

(Priority No. 10)

Defendants-Respondents
ooOoo
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
ooOoo
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT
OF THE SEVIER DISTRICT COURT
THE HONORABLE DON V. TIBBS
DISTRICT JUDGE
ooOoo
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
ALAN S. BACHMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 537-1017
Tex R. 01sen
Ken Chamberlain
Kay L. Mclff
151 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone: (801) 896-5441
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
i, ii,
iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
INTRODUCTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A. JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE

2

B. DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

2

C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT

11

POINT I
SECTION 78-34-4 UTAH CODE ANN. (1953)
CREATES A PRESUMPTION THAT IN AN
EMINENT DOMAIN ACTION, THE TIME OF
VALUATION IS THE DATE OF THE SERVICE
OF SUMMONS

11

POINT II
THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT UDOT ACTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH EMINENT DOMAIN LAW
IN THE ACQUISITION OF THE DEFENDANTSRESPONDENTS' PROPERTY

17

POINT III
THE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED
TO STATUTORY INTEREST FROM AND AFTER
THE GRANTING OF AN ORDER OF IMMEDIATE
OCCUPANCY

22

POINT IV
THE VALUATION DATE IS CONSIDERED A
DEFENSE TO A CONDEMNATION ACTION AND
IS ABANDONED WHEN THE DEFENDANT
LANDOWNER WITHDRAWS THE PLAINTIFF'S
DEPOSIT

-i-

27

POINT V
THE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS' EXPERT WITNESS,
MR. KAY McIFF (WHO WAS THEIR PRIOR ATTORNEY)
ERRED WHEN TESTIFYING CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH LIND PROPERTY
BECAUSE HE RELIED UPON IT BEING ASSEMBLED
WITH ADJOINING PROPERTIES

30

CONCLUSION

35

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

38

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
City of Cheyenne v. Frangos, 487 P.2d 804
(Wyo. 1971)
City of So. Ogden v. Fuliki, 621 P.2d
1254 (Utah 1980)
UDOT v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821
(Utah 1984)

17
23
8, 11,
12, 13,
23, 28,
29, 35

Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246
(1934)

34

UDOT v. Partington, Civil No. 10129

14

Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v.
Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1987)
Salt Lake County v. Ramoselll, 567 P.2d 182
(Utah 1977)

29
9, 19,
20, 22

Sproul Homes of Nevada v. State Ex. Rel. Dept. of Highways
and County of Clark, 611 P.2d 620 (Nev. 1980)
26, 27
State v. Bettilyon, 17 Utah 2d 135, 405
P.2d 420 (1965)
-ii-

24, 25

State v. Jacobs, 16 Utah 2d 167, 397
P.2d 463 (1964)
State v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265
P.2d 630 (1953)
United States v. 70.39 Acres of Land, etc.,
164 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.Cal. 1958)
United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson,
319 U.S. 266 (1942)
Walton v. UDOT, 558 P.2d 609 (Utah 1976)

33
24
34
34
18, 19,
22

STATUTES CITED
Page
Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-12 (1953)

19

Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-25(2)

19

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36(1)

19

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4 (1987)

11

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 (1987)

12, 22,
27, 29

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 (1987)

11

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-19 (1987)

9, 20,
22, 36

-ill-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

00O00
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

:
:

Plaintiff-Appellant,
:
vs.
LAYGO COMPANY, et al.,
J. D. SPRINGER,

t

Case No. 890173

:

(Priority No. 10)

Defendants-Respondents
00O00

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
ooOoo
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT
OF THE SEVIER DISTRICT COURT
THE HONORABLE DON V. TIBBS
DISTRICT JUDGE
ooOoo

INTRODUCTION

This Brief is based upon and very similar to the
one filed by Stephen C. Ward, Assistant Attorney General, on
behalf of the Utah Department of Transportation in regard to
the cases wherein the Defendants are Walter M. Ogden, et al.
and Rulon Lind and Flora S. Lind, his wife, et al.

The purpose

of this Brief is to relate the similar arguments to the cases
wherein the Defendants are Laygo Company, et al. and J.D.
Springer.

These aforesaid four cases shall be referred to in

this Brief as the "Ogden", "Lind", "Laygo" and "Springer" cases,
respectively.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Under the exigent facts of these cases in eminent

domain, should the lower Court have changed the dates of
valuation from the statutory date of service of Summons in
October, 1987 to June of 1977?
2.

Under the exigent facts of these cases, should the

lower Court have changed when interest should commence to run
from the dates the Order of Occupancy were granted in October,
1987 to June of 1977?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE.

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider
this matter as a result of the granting of a Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal on May 23, 1989.
The Plaintiff-Appellant Utah Department of
Transportation appeals from an order changing the statutory dates
of valuation and when interest should run.

The Plaintiff-

Appellant Utah Department of Transportation filed condemnation
actions in 1987 to acquire portions of the DefendantsRespondents' property to construct 1-70 west of Richfield City.
The Sevier District Court also granted the Plaintiff-Appellant's
Orders of Occupancy in the Laygo and Springer cases and did so
shortly after the cases were filed.
The dispute in this litigation involves the Sevier
District Court changing the dates of valuation and when statutory
interest should commence to run from October, 1987 to June, 1977.
B.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT.

The Laygo, Springer, Ogden and Lind cases have not been
consolidated for trial, but have only been consolidated for the
purpose of determining the dates of valuation and when interest
should commence to run. A nonjury trial was held before Judge
Don V. Tibbs on March 9, 10, and 13, 1989 and orders fixing the
dates of valuation and when interest should commence to run were
entered April 10, 1987.

(Laygo R-221-224, Springer R-215-218)
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The Plaintiff-Appellant by this appeal seeks to have the
foregoing orders reversed and to have the Utah Supreme Court
order the dates of valuation and when interest should commence to
run to be 1987.
C.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.

The Defendants-Respondents Laygo and Springer in these
two cases each owned property which was needed for the
construction of 1-70 in the area located west of Richfield, Utah.
(Laygo R-l, Springer R-l)

The Defendants-Respondents were served

with Summons on the following dates:
a.

Laygo - October 15, 1987.

b.

Springer - October 7, 1987.

(R-17-19)
(R-19-21)

The Plaintiff-Appellant tendered into Court its
approved appraisals and secured uncontested Orders of Occupancy
from the above-entitled Court on October 28/ 1987.

(Laygo R-21-

27 and Springer R-23-28)
The Defendants-Respondents withdrew the approved
appraisal amounts which previously had been tendered into Court
by the Plaintiff-Appellant without raising any issue with respect
to either the Court's ordering different dates of valuation or
the commencement of interest to run.

(Laygo R-27, Springer R-28)

On January 19, 1988, the Laygo Defendants-Respondents
filed their Answer with the Court.

On October 21, 1987, the

Springer Defendants-Respondents filed their Answer with the
above-entitled Court.

(Laygo R-29-31, Springer R-l6-18)

In

neither of the Defendants-Respondents' Answers did they raise any
issue with respect to this Court ordering different dates of
valuation or the commencement of interest to run.
Interrogatories were served on the DefendantsRespondents by the Plaintiff-Appellant on January 12 (Springer)
and 14 (Laygo) 1988, which to this date have remained unanswered.
(Laygo R-32, Springer R-30)
A pretrial was held on each of these cases before the
above-entitled Court on the 6th day of July, 1988.
34, Springer R-31)

(Laygo R-33-

Plaintiff-Appellant's counsel was directed to

prepare the Pretrial Order.

Neither of these two Defendants-

Respondents raised any issue or concern during the pretrial
hearing with respect to having this Court order different dates
of valuation or the commencement of interest to run.

(Laygo R-

173-176, Springer R-171-174)
Copies of the proposed Pretrial Order were sent to
Defendants-Respondent's counsel to approve as to form on July 15,
1988.

(Laygo R-173-176, Springer R-171-174)
Defendants-Respondents' counsel neither approved the

Pretrial Orders as to form nor submitted the Orders to the Court
for execution.

(Laygo R-173-176, Springer R-171-174)

On July 18, 1988, the Plaintiff-Appellant submitted to
the Defendants-Respondents a list of its potential witnesses and
Exhibits.

The Defendants-Respondents have failed to submit their

lists of witnesses to the Plaintiff-Appellant.
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(Laygo R-37-38,

Springer R-35-36)
In 1977, the Utah Department of Transportation approved
the alignment of 1-70 to be west of Richfield, but did not
receive its funding until December 20, 1985.
Springer R-46)

(Laygo R-48,

In the meantime, between 1977 and 1985 when the

project became funded, UDOT would have been making its final
design in relation to each individual property owner involved.
The properties involved would not have been ready to acquire
until 1985.

(Laygo R-91, Springer R-89)

On March 18, 1977, UDOT completed its Environmental
Impact Statement and on June 22, 1977, secured Federal Highway
Administration approval.

(Laygo R-91, Springer R-89)

In the past UDOT may have argued against Richfield City
approving any development in the proposed interstate corridors,
but the final decision has always rested with Richfield City.
(Laygo R-91, Springer R-89)

There is no evidence in the record

that Richfield City actually adopted any law or regulation that
prohibited development in the proposed interstate corridor.
It was the testimony of the Plaintiff-Appellant's MAI
real estate appraiser that with respect to the DefendantRespondents Springer that this property was too costly to develop
in 1977 as well as in 1987.

(Tr. 407-411)

Larger waterlines

would be needed for subdivision of the Springer property and
there is no sewer.

(Tr. 409)

Septic tank approval would not be

allowed on the Springer property due to the presence of a nearby
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spring.

(Tr. 409-410)

The cost of all utilities and the

sewer/septic tank problems, led the State's expert appraiser to
conclude that the highest and best use of the Springer property
to be "horse belt" in both 1977 and 1987. (Tr. 410-411)
The State's expert appraiser testimony by Mr. Lang,
MAI, indicates that the Laygo property would be capable of being
subdivided into the same number of lots (19) both in the "before
interstate condition" and the "after interstate condition".

This

is because the lots that have property taken by the project are
deeper than necessary under the City of Richfield's zoning
requirements.

(Tr. 413-415)

Mr. Lang further testified that the lot prices would
have been lower in 1977 than in 1987. (Tr. 420)
Mr. Pete Monson, UDOT District Preconstruction
Engineer, testified that the amount of Laygo property that could
be taken by the relocation of the canal was limited by the
location of a nearby City spring and pump house. (Tr. 432-433)
Mr. Monson also testified that he had been approached
by one of the Laygo property owners about five or six years ago
to delineate an approximate location for the shifting of the
canal (the take to occur) on the Laygo property, but that such
request was withdrawn. (Tr. 435)
Mr. Kay Mclff who was the Defendants-Respondents'
attorney of record up until a few days before trial, was the only
witness (other than parties) called by the Defendants-Respondents
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during the trial.

(Laygo 39-40, Springer 37-38)

Mr* Mclff

testified he had a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of
the case, and was not an independent witness.

(Tr. 221) Mr.

Mclff did not know the number of lots available for sale in the
Richfield area in 1977.

(Tr. 214) Mr. Mclff testified that he

could not ascertain in 1977 that the Defendants-Respondents'
properties were going to be impacted with the construction of
1-70 because there was no final design of 1-70.

(Tr. 218)

Mr. Mclff made no explanation of the costs involved in
the presentation of Defendant-Respondents case in chief to bring
utilities to the Defendant-Respondents' properties.

(Tr. 223 and

Tr. 257 wherein Mr. Mclff indicates that his answer would be
basically the same for the "Springer" parcel as he had answered
for the northern "Lind" parcel since the Springer parcel is just
north of the northern Lind parcel)
Mi*. Mclff had not conducted a "vacant buildable lands
inventory" nor studied the number of available homes for sale.
(Tr. 259)
Mir. Mclff indicated that the City of Richfield did "not
per se" adopt any law restricting development within the corridor
of the freeway.

(Tr. 261)

There is no evidence in the record that Springer or
Laygo attempted to develop their properties, such as updated
platting or seeking building permits.

This would include the

portion of the Laygo property that was separated by another road
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from the proposed interstate had n^4- K ^ e n subject to a bu Ilding
j. _ ^ w w. updated platting.
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SUMMAR1 01: .ARGUMENT
The time of valuation Is presumed In be 1 In iJain ul
service of summons.

UDOT v. Friberg, 687 P, 2d 82 1 i|lliah 19fM)
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mi mi mi I I
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" a I u n a h a u l s u l i * 11 n i l n i l I >, •

changed over a period nt time and other circumstances warrant
such a change in the date
such a change

1 .'alum

The Friberg < aso would not support

in I In

sill) JCM Jl

aaseh h nice I. he

circumstances arc-? not at all similar and f

In any event, there has

not been d

'abstantial rhanqo in values from the date of service

of summons

-he date lequest eiI by be I'ei idai i"l :s- Respc >ndei i I .s.
•-he Defendants-Respondents were correct in asserting
i»'1 II mII hostage" since 1977 by govern-

that t h e n
mental action, thei

--«*•<.- of action accrued then which would

now be barred by any applicable statute
(TIIVHI

iiiiipfil a I I iiiiiHiii i I y At I

"T'liO" iH-'lenria

-o-

: limitations and the
- l e s p o n d e n t s d i d i 10 1:

pursue such a claim in a timely manner, did not send notice under
the Governmental Immunity Act, did not raise it in their answers
to the subject complaints, did not raise it at the hearing on the
subject motions for immediate occupancyf and did not raise it
prior to withdrawing the funds deposited with the Court upon
granting of the subject motions for immediate occupancy.

To

allow such a claim in the untimely manner that DefendantsRespondents have done, places governments in an extremely
difficult position in pursuing public projects.
The subject properties were not "held hostage" by
governmental action in 1977. The landowners did not pursue
development of the property, even to the extent that would have
been compatible with the proposed interstate.
In any event, UDOT would have been prevented from
instituting eminent domain proceedings in 1977 because funding
for the project was not available until December, 1985.
Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 P.2d 182 (Utah 1977).

Salt

The State of

Utah should not be subject to an earlier valuation date than the
service of summons when the Supreme Court of Utah determines that
such earlier date is premature for the exercise of eminent domain
due to lack of funding.
In 1981, the Utah Legislature passed Utah Code Ann.
S 78-34-19 which discourages government from premature
condemnations.

It would also subject the State of Utah to stiff

penalties if condemnation actions had been filed in 1977, as it
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would have been, very premature, as funding w a s
The Defendants-Respondents should only b e entitled • >
interest 1 i/uin I,In- iluh

I I.lit' |i|il I M M I

immediate occupancy

order since UDOT did n o t possess or occupy the properties before
that time.

Additionally, the immediate occupancy orders nafct-

reference t o anv

:

announcement of a project (which occurred here
award interest from since

the

property owner a windfall as they
compensation for a n y improvements they made *

property

—

summons.
• * .

Defendants-Respondents shiiuJ d in • I I

allowed t o pursue an alternate valuation date or interest date
whei

-#
T h e alternate -:m.K *. ^ clearl>

Cour*
act 3

*

r

*-ha*

compensation.

different fvw

- effuse to a condemnat i 01 :i

i st r ^ i ^ - ' n i c additional
r

Requesting

substantially different in prosecuting
dom<

Lne District

-iefending a n eminent

merely alleging that * - defendant should b e

entitled to greater compensa! I

u\ <J

i

fact, requesting a n alternate date is t h e functional equivalent
oil i

condemnation, which is certainly

different from merely requesting greater compelihin
answer

i i u mlt-i

n

. complaint.
Tin

11.1 is! t j i i i'i r I I h»iU I v iprred i n allowing testimony

relative to the highest and best use that was based upon
speculative assemblage of certain of the properties.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-4 (1987) CREATES A
PRESUMPTION THAT IN AN EMINENT DOMAIN ACTION,
THE TIME OF VALUATION IS THE DATE OF THE SERVICE
OF SUMMONS.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4 (1987) fixes the date of the
service of summons for the purpose of determining just
compensation:
For the purpose of assessing compensation
and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed
to have accrued at the date of the service of
summons f and its actual value at that date shall
be the measure of compensation for all property
to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to
property not actually taken, but injuriously
affected, in all cases where such damages are
allowed, as provided in the next preceding section
[§ 78-34-10]. No improvements put upon the
property subsequent to the date of service of
summons shall be included in the assessment of
compensation or damages. [Emphasis added]
[Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4 (1987)]
The Defendants-Respondents cite the case of UDOT v.
Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984), as authority for changing the
date of valuation in an eminent domain case. A close reading of
the facts in the Friberg case will easily distinguish it from the
Defendants-Respondents case.
In the Friberg case, UDOT actually filed an action in
eminent domain in 1972 to acquire a portion of the Defendants'
-11-

property.

Shortly thereafter, at the hearing on t;^ motion .

•-' of Immediate Occupancy, the Defendant landowners
d e c l i n e d t o withdraw I

ev i OIIH ,h| '

had been deposited into Court.
, !-<v-ys dibu xcrserved * l <- issue

- • Laintiff's

right to acquire the property
compensation was delayed for ^^ ^v y*~- ° because of * -

federal

ear period of time, Salt Lake City
land values substantially increased.
v

The Supreme Cour:
dele

uie te. *

:

values
date

he Friberg case, because

:

+4

The C o m r

I In

- doing -~ ^dded the

,
l

follow "a caution:

~ rid
j

. ake i:i.y HO.I substantially increases

• valuation to 1979.

*" the

on e ,s of the

"

service of summons date will r-r the rule, and departure from that
seption
Justice Oaks -

uu /
*« concur.

Fribergs did not abandon their right tr) litigate the question of
tlnif

1ftfj

f

-I I nii••ml ni 11

Ihpnaupp they did nnt withdraw t h e $80,000

that had previously been deposited p U r s u a n t
Immediate Occupancy.
valuatxuii w";,j

Justice Oaks concluded that the date of

) \ '.lender wi «";i

decided by the Court,

t !'M,J state's right to condemn was

The State's right to condemn was

established until December, 1979.
Utal i Code A. i i

i'11 ,1 • I " I n," I "' <' 11 / I

I a I t • n I, I • e, f f» 1 I o w i n g :

The rights of the just compensation for the
land so taken or damaged shall vest in the parties
entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be
ascertained and awarded as provided in § 78-34-10
and established by judgment therein, and the said
judgment shall include, as part of the just compensation awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per annum
on the amount finally awarded as the value of the
property and damages, from the date of taking
actual possession thereof by the plaintiff or order
of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date of
judgment; but interest shall not be allowed on so
much thereof as shall have been paid into court.
Upon the application of the parties in interest,
the court shall order the money deposited in the
court be paid forthwith for or on account of the
just compensation to be awarded in the proceeding.
A payment to a defendant as aforesaid shall be held
to be an abandonment by such defendant of all
defenses excepting his claim for greater compensation. [Emphasis added]
The Friberg case expressly disallows the Defendant
landowners a different valuation date if the order of occupancy
is granted and the landowners withdraw the approved appraisal
from the Court.
The Defendants-Respondents on Page 18 of their
Memorandum state the following:
"If the (Richfield) market would have continued to
improve (from 1977). Defendants would have been
uninjured." (Laygo R-60, Springer R-58)
These Defendants-Respondents seem to be proposing that
anytime between the announcement of a corridor for a proposed
road occurs and when the service of summons happens the landowner
can choose their date of valuation when real estate values are
the highest.

How anxious would the Defendant-Respondent

landowners be willing to change the date of valuation from
-13-

1986 to 1977 If real estate values had continued to increase?
The Defendants-Respondents

•

v

brief refer to lhe
g>as i; eciMI 1 I! \

~*~~ ~« UDOT v. Partington, Civi 1
tried

** D i s t r i c t Court v: Sevier County
is i

testifiea i

.-nee per air

attorney ^ record.

is i n t e r e s t i n g

*fendant I an iowners
^.

Kay Mclff was the

The Partington property is located in close

I

Page 83 of the Transcript of the testimony of Mr. ^~u~
Brown, the appraiser hired by the Partingtons, states as follows:
Partingtoi I i, aJ i la t: i c i i da te w as ] 98 7
Sale No.
February, 1980 5.1 acres.
Sale price: $67,830.00 - $13,300 per acne=J
50 percent adjustment for location
10 percent for size
Total add on adjustment per acre was
Per acre value was $17,955.00
Seller Wallace Sorenson
Buyer Hal Ward
Located at 300 East in Richfield, Utah.
Sa1«.' If Illlni. 7
Located off 5th East and 8th North Richfield City 15.28 acres
Sorenson Estates was the Seller
Brush Wellman was the Buyer
Sale price: $121,467.00
Price per acre $7,947.00
Adjusted price $16,690.00
No sales date listed
Sale No. I
Location at 11th West and 520 South Richfield City
Sale date 198?
Seller Da r^*"

Buyer Craig Anderson
Sale price $52,500.00
Per acre value $10,500.00
30 percent plus adjustment
Net adjustment of $7,350.00
Adjusted value of subject $17,850.00
Sale No. 4:
Sale date January 1983
Seller Richfield Land
Buyer Khoesrow
9.36 acres in located North of Richfield City
Golf Course
Total sale price $11,431.00
Total adjustments $7,143.00
Adjusted value of subject property $18,574.00
Sale No. 5:
Seller Labrum Investment
Buyer Gordon - Sale date August, 1988
North of Richfield City Golf Course
1.07 acres
$30,000.00 sale price
Per acre value of $28,037.00
50 percent adjustment for size
Adjusted price of subject property
$19,627,00 (Laygo R-76, 98-99, Springer R-74,
96-97)
Mr. Brown made no adjustments for time on any of
his sales.

The sales ranged from February, 1980 to August,

1988.
The Partington property is located west of Richfield
City and in close proximity to the Laygo and Springer properties.
The Partington case used the service of summons date of valuation
of 1987.

In Paragraph 26 on Page 11 of the Defendant's memo, the

Defendants use a figure of $13,500 as the value of what the Laygo
and Springer property should be.

(Laygo R. 53, Springer R. 51)

It is interesting that with a 1987 valuation date, the appraiser
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in the Partington case used a figure of $17,500 as the value of
the property taken,
POINT

"

THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT UDOT ACTED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH EMINENT DOMAIN LAW IN THE ACQUISITION OF THE
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS' PROPERTY.
Any reference In the Defendants-Respondents' Memorandum
c

iiil Court relatincr i

and/or proposed completion dates ^
which

nnon newspaper

>

* otuv cf the rankest forms of hearsay evidence that

exJ

!

)

merely the opinion

I'll* foregoinq is

ewspaper .: :egard to when the

completion date i 4

*he announcement of

0 might be.

City of Cheyenne v. Frangosf

:

The Defendants argue on Page 22 of their brief the
following (Laygo

p

M

c

pringer R-62):

Defendants do not claim the creation of a
cause of action against either Federal or State
authorities ?,o: do they impugn their integrity.
Thp^* "v\
allowed

- •- "t-spondents argue they should be

.oose then aac.:

time of the announcement of
£

valuatioi as any ..ate betweei i tl le
corridor
place

is flawed and without legal precedence.

and when the
':l

r

oregoing reasoning

-, landowners ui tlii, ,*r

case choose 197? because at first glance this appears to be the
1
permits.

i • hI i ii" Id (' i I y r\ r a n ! r d 1
(Laygo R-49, Springer R-47)

b u x 1 tiiJiq

The problem being there is no cause and effect
relationship between 1977, the year that Richfield City granted
the highest number of building permits and the proposed
announcement of the 1-70 corridor.

(Tr. 210)

There is evidence

that as early as 1970, that UDOT preliminary approved the present
corridor.

The Defendants-Respondents have made no correlation

between the demand for building permits in 1977 and how many
building lots were offered for sale.

(Tr. 214)

The real problem with the foregoing reasoning of the
Defendants-Respondents lies arguendo in the fact that if their
property was taken or damaged in 1977, they were then obligated
to pursue their legal remedies as outlined in the case of Walton
v. UD0Ty 558 P.2d 609 (Utah 1976).

In the Walton case, UDOT

regarded a public street in the Summit Park subdivision to create
a better street for cars to travel on during the temporary
construction of 1-80.

The landowners felt by UDOT altering this

access their property had been taken and/or damaged.

The

landowners instituted an action against UDOT to recover damages
resulting from the alleged alteration of their access.

The Utah

Supreme Court ruled the Plaintiff had an action in law and is
thus governed by the Governmental Immunity Act and the limitation
of actions.
The Defendants-Respondents have obviously failed to
comply with any applicable statute of limitations and must be
precluded from raising such a claim beyond such limitation
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period

Foi instance, Utah Code J Ann, § 76-12-36(1) (1987)

IPP .11 il i Hf« yp.Li - t nit mi'r« ai limitations for "trespass upon
.- injury to j r-M I property" and Utah Code Ann
(1987) provides for a four year statute of limitations where one
i? i se pi: o < i :i • ied 1:: ] ] a ; ;
If, as the Defendants-Respondents *~
allege, tha

case at b a r

* a king and/or damaging of their property occurred
I

Walton

with t h e waiver of Immunity A c t

Utah Code Ann § 63-30*

( 1 9 5 3 ) , bars a claim under the Governmental Immunity A c t unless
w r i t t e n notice

; J i l n l v• ilh

I In

Ulah At 1 ui ney CeiietdJ 1 rjjn.l llii"

agency concerned within one year after the cause of action
""Il""lr

Nruiitifh. in i I Inp Walton ease and the Defendants-

Respondents ,i in the cast,' at bar failed to allege the foregoing.
The Defendants i i i the case at bar are n o w precluded from alleging
11 I 1 1 K i l i y

I ni mi i Il »I in I ! i ni 1 1 1 in mi i

in 19 7 7 .

•

Ill I I I! ni mi mi 11 ni 11 [ H* ' i I "i, I 11 ni I mi mi ni 11 j, * I ni 11 "I i» i

As set forth in the Statement
t i l I !"'« f J d l t 1 T ii I I i

1985,

(Tr.

|I

\\

'

i. I '

' I

»r cur r e d

r Facts, t h e funding - - *

1 Wi 1

2 4 6 , 24 9)

The foregoing raises a problem which w a s dealt with in
the case oi bait Lake Comity v. Ramosella
1977),

Surprisingly enough, the Ramoselli case w a s decided t h e

same year ri*i I ho current Defendants-Respondents want as their
date of valuation.

In t h e Ramoselli case the IJ" I airrlli i t Mall I.fike

County was precluded from condemning the Defendant's property
because there were no funds in existence in Salt Lake County to
develop the property to the use specified in the Plaintiff's
Complaint.

The Supreme Court felt because said funding was not

present, that Salt Lake County failed in its burden of proving
need or public necessity and that the attempted condemnation was
a clear abuse of discretion.

Under the facts of the Ramoselli

case, the Plaintiff-Appellant in the cases at bar would have been
precluded from condemning the Defendants-Respondents' property
before they had the funding in place to commence the construction
of 1-70 in the area of the Defendants-Respondents' property.

The

foregoing only applies to situations of eminent domain and not
voluntary advance acquisitions.
The problems raised immediately above were exacerbated
in 1981 when the Utah Legislature passed Utah Code Ann.
S 78-34-19 (1987) which states as follows;
78-34-19. Action to set aside condemnation for failure
to commence or complete construction within reasonable
time.
(1) In an action to condemn property, if the
court makes a finding of what is a reasonable time
for commencement of construction and use of all the
property sought to be condemned and the construction and use is not accomplished within the time
specified, the condemnee may file an action against
the condemnor to set aside the condemnation of the
entire parcel or any portion thereof upon which
construction and use was to have taken place.
(2) In such action, if the court finds that the
condemnor, without reasonable justification, did not
commence or complete construction and use within the
time specified, it shall enter judgment fixing the
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amount the condemnor has paid the condemnee, as a
result of condemnation and all amounts due the
condemnee as damages sustained by reason of condemnation , including damages resulting from partial completion of the contemplated use, plus all reasonable
and necessary expenses actually incurred by the
condemnee including attorney fees.
(3) If amounts due the condemnee under Subsection
(2) of this section exceed amounts paid by the condemnor , or these amounts are equal, judgment shall be
entered in favor of the condemnee, which judgment
shall described the property condemned and award
judgment for any amounts due condemnee. A copy of the
judgment shall be filed in the office of the county
recorder of the county, and thereupon the property
described therein shall vest in the condemnee.
(4) If amounts paid by the condemnor under Subsection (2) of this section exceed amounts due the
condemnee, judgment shall be entered describing the
property condemned and giving the condemnee 60 days
from the date thereof to pay the difference between
the amounts to the condemnor. If payment is made,
the court shall amend the judgment to reflect such
payment and order the amended judgment filed with
the office of the county recorder of the county,
and thereupon the property described therein shall
vest in the condemnee. If payment is not made, the
court shall amend the judgment to reflect nonpayment
and order the amended judgment filed with the county
recorder of the county.
Basically, the trial court can set a reasonable date in
which construction of the contemplated project should commence.
Also, a rather stiff penalty is imposed on the condemnor for
failure to comply.
In the case at bar, if the condemnation were commenced
before the contemplated project was fully designed and funded,
the Plaintiff-Appellant UDOT could subject itself to rather stiff
penalties.

The foregoing shows the intent of the legislature to
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not acquire private property before such time as the condemnor
can physically use the condemned property.

Under the rational of

the Ramoselli case and Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-19 (1987),
Plaintiff-Appellant UDOT would have been precluded from acquiring
by eminent domain the Defendants-Respondents' property in 1977.
Also, under the rational of the Walton case, the statute of
limitations has now run on the Defendants-Respondents alleging a
taking and/or damaging of their property in 1977.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO STATUTORY
INTEREST FROM AND AFTER THE GRANTING OF AN ORDER OF
IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY.
The applicable State statute regarding the payment of
interest in eminent domain cases is found in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-34-9 (1987) which reads as follows:
. . . The rights of the just compensation
for the land so taken or damaged shall vest in the
parties entitled thereto, and said compensation shall
be ascertained and awarded as provided in § 78-34-10
and established by judgment therein, and the said
judgment shall include, as part of the just compensation awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per
annum on the amount finally awarded as the value
of the property and damages, from the date of
taking actual possession thereof by the Plaintiff
or order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the
date of judgment . . . [Emphasis added]
The Court in the Laygo and Springer cases granted the
Plaintiff-Appellant an Order of Immediate Occupancy on October
28, 1987. The two Orders of Occupancy do not contain any
reservation whatsoever that interest should be computed in any
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other manner than that described in the statute referred to
above.
It is interesting to note that the case of City of So,
Oqden v, Fujiki, 621 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1980) was cited as authority
in the case of UDOT v, Friberq, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984).

There

is no mention whatsoever of the Friberq case overruling,
superseding or

modifying in any way the Fujiki case.

There is

absolutely no legal justification for the Defendants-Respondents
assertion that the Fujiki case is "of questionable validity"
because of the Friberq case.

(Laygo R-65, Springer R-63)

The

only reason for the Defendants-Respondents' statement is that the
holding in the Fujiki case is directly contrary to the position
these Defendants-Respondents now want this Court to adopt.

In

the Fujiki case, the City of South Ogden filed its Complaint to
acquire a portion of the Defendants' property.

The City of South

Ogdenf in its Complaint, referred to their application for an
Order of Immediate Occupancy, but never applied for an Order from
the Court.

In between the filing of the original Complaint and

the date Judgment was entered, neither the City nor the
Defendants occupied the property sought to be condemned.

The

Utah Supreme Court held that the City did not occupy the property
in question and therefore interest should only run from the date
the final Judgment was entered.
The Friberq case cited as authority on Page 835 and
followed the holding of the Fujiki case and only allowed the

Fribergs' interest on the award from the date of the Fribergs'
abandonment of the property.

The obvious rational being that as

long as the Fribergs were occupying their home, which was located
on the property sought to be condemned, that UDOT could not
occupy the Defendants' property and therefore would not be
obligated to pay interest.
Similar issues raised by the Laygo and Springer
Defendants-Respondents were considered and decided in the case of
State v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P.2d 630 (1953).

In the Peek

case, the Defendants argued the service of summons effectively
interfered with the use of their property and therefore was an
unconstitutional taking without the payment of just compensation.
That service of summons practically eliminated any possibility
for the sale of their property.

The Utah Supreme Court held the

Defendants in the Peek case were not entitled to interest on the
Judgment prior to the time actual possession was taken.

There is

more of a taking involved with the service of summons than with a
corridor announcement because no improvements put on the property
thereafter will be paid for. As noted above, the Utah Supreme
Court only allowed interest from the date of actual possession by
the condemnor.
The case of State v. Bettilyon, 17 Utah 2d 135, 405
P.2d 420 (1965) dealt with the issue of what constitutes a
"taking of actual possession" of property.

In the Bettilyon case

the landowners applied to Salt Lake County for approval of a

subdivision, but upon the request of UDOT the County deferred the
approval of the subdivision because UDOT expected to use some of
the proposed subdivision property for highway construction.

The

Utah Supreme Court held this did not constitute a taking and
condemnees were not entitled to recover expenses incurred
thereafter or interest from the date of deferment.

The facts in

the Bettilyon case are much stronger in that neither the Laygo
nor Springer Respondents-Defendants ever applied for any proposed
development of their property, including a portion of the Laygo
property which was separated by a road from any proposal for the
interstate.

The Springer property had a highest and best use of

horse belt either with or without the freeway, either in 1977 or
1987, due to the high costs in either scenario of bringing urban
services to the property.

(Tr. 411)

The Laygo property could

have only a limited portion taken in 1977 or 1987 due to the
location of a nearby spring and pump house that was to be
preserved and, in any event, the property owners withdrew their
effort with UDOT to delineate the approximate location of the
proposed relocation of the canal that would result from the
interstate project.

(Tr. 432-438)

Consequently, there is no

taking by UDOT of the Defendants-Respondents Laygo and Springer
properties so as to cause interest to run.
A case from the State of Nevada supports the conclusion
that there was insufficient governmental intrusion in the
Springer and Laygo cases to support Defendants-Respondents
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claims.

(Of course, if there was such a claim available then,

the statute of limitations and governmental immunity statutes
would have barred such a claim now, as discussed previously in
this brief).

In Sproul Homes of Nevada v. State Ex. Rel. Dept.

of Highways and County of Clark, 611 P.2d 620 (1980), the Nevada
Supreme Court held that certain precondemnation activities did
not give rise to an inverse condemnation action, which is really
the essence of Defendants' claim herein desiring an earlier
valuation date.

In Sproul Homesf the complaint alleged that the

State indicated a need to construct a portion of U.S. 95
Expressway, that the State discussed with the landowners the
intention of the State to acquire a large portion of their land,
that the State entered the land for purposes of a survey and
appraisal, and that the landowners could not obtain building
permits to construct improvements on the subject property.

In

fact, the Clark County Board of Commissioners approved a zone
change on the subject land with the condition "'that no
development will take place on the triangular portion of property
bound by the proposed freeway...'••.

Sproul Homes, supra at 621.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that the mere planning
of the project, studying and surveying the land in light of no
showing of a physical invasion of the land or finality of the
acquisition of the subject property by the State, did not give
rise to an inverse condemnation claim.

The Court found that the

State had placed no legal or physical obstacles on the

development of the property and therefore no "precondemnation"
had occurred.
The facts in the Sproul Homes case were actually much
closer to establish governmental intrusion that the case at hand.
Nevertheless, the Sproul Homes case and the case at hand both
involve situations where the project had not been finalized at
the time the landowners claim a condemnation occurred.

To the

extent there was any precondemnation obstruction of development
in the proposed highway corridor, it was the result of actions by
the City of Richfield and not the State.
R-89)

(Laygo R-91, Springer

Nevertheless, there is no evidence in the record that the

City of Richfield denied any development on the subject
properties.
POINT IV
THE VALUATION DATE IS CONSIDERED A DEFENSE TO A
CONDEMNATION ACTION AND IS ABANDONED WHEN THE
DEFENDANT LANDOWNER WITHDRAWS THE PLAINTIFF'S
DEPOSIT.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 (1987) deals with the issue
of when a Defendant landowner abandons their defenses to a
condemnation action.

The pertinent part of the statute reads as

follows:
Upon the application of the parties in interest,
the court shall order the money deposited in the
court be paid forthwith for or on account of the
just compensation to be awarded in the proceeding.
A payment to a Defendant as aforesaid shall be
held to be an abandonment by such Defendant of all
defenses excepting his claim for greater compensation. [Emphasis added]
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As noted above, the Plaintiff tendered into Court the
full amounts of its approved appraisals and the deposited funds
were shortly thereafter withdrawn by each of the DefendantRespondents.

The Defendants-Respondents by their withdrawal

abandon all "defenses" to the Plaintiff-Appellant's action in
eminent domain, except their claims for greater compensation.
The statute seems to differentiate between "defenses"
and claims for greater compensation.

The argument which the

Defendants-Respondents raise in their memo that "valuation date"
and "greater compensation" are synonymous is totally absurd and
without legal recognition.

(Laygo R-68, Springer R-66)

Justice Oaks in his concurring opinion in the case of
UDOT v. Friberg, 687 P.2d at 836 stated the following:
While I share the dissent's view that the best
interests of all concerned dictate that the State's
right to take by eminent domain be resolved as soon
as possible, property owners who do not abandon their
defenses in the manner specified in § 78-34-9 (withdraw the Plaintiffs' deposit) must have an opportunity
to litigate them. Either party can bring that issue
on for decision, with or without a simultaneous determination of "damages" (compensation). Because that
was not done in the case (withdrawal of the Plaintiffs'
deposit) the effect was to postpone the date for the
determination of value (compensation), as explained
below. (Explanation in parenthesis added by this
writer.)
Justice Oaks goes on his opinion and equates the
"State's right to condemn" and "date of valuation" as defenses
which are waived and conceded by the Defendant landowners when
an Order of Immediate Occupancy is granted and the Defendant
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landowners withdraw from the Court the condemnors' deposit.
The foregoing is also adhered to in the case of
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296
(Utah 1987).

The Tanner case cites the UDOT v. Friberg case as

follows:
The parties entered into a stipulation
that was incorporated into an order establishing
the State's right to condemn and reserving for
later determination the amount of compensation to
be awarded and the date for assessing valuation.
Tanner, 740 P.2d at 1300.
The Court in the Tanner case held that once a property
owner chooses to withdraw the money deposited by the State in
obtaining the Order, he waives all objections and defenses to the
action and to the taking of his property, except any claim to
greater compensation.

The Court went on to hold that by the

Defendants-Respondents withdrawing the monies, the PlaintiffAppellant acknowledged that the condemnor had met all of the
jurisdictional requirements.
In the present case, to allow the DefendantsRespondents to now contest the valuation date would be to
sanction abuse.

To allow the Defendants-Respondents to depart

from the rule set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 (1987) is to
invite controversy in every condemnation case and afford a means
for parties to manipulate the measure of compensation, which the
statutory provisions attempt to prevent.

If the Defendants-

Respondents wished to have contested the valuation date, they
should have raised it in their response to the Complaint and
-28-

should have not withdrawn the immediate occupancy deposit.
POINT V
THE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS' EXPERT WITNESSf MR.
KAY McIFF (WHO WAS THEIR PRIOR ATTORNEY) ERRED
WHEN TESTIFYING CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPRINGER PROPERTY BECAUSE HE RELIED
UPON IT BEING ASSEMBLED WITH ADJOINING PROPERTIES.
Mr. Mclff's testimony relative to the highest and best
use and development of the Springer property in 1977 was
predicated on it being assembled into a roughly 20 acre tract
total.

(Tr. 499)
"A.

Assemblage is kind of the reverse of subdivision.

It's appraising a parcel of property in conjunction with other
properties with which it may be joined for a common utilization.
Q.

Talking about consolidation?

A.

Consolidation.

And you employ it where that kind

of consolidation or assemblage would be mutually advantageous and
help realize the highest and best use out of that property.
Q.

Is assemblage a common phenomenon in the

development of real property where there is no unity of title as
Mr. Ward correctly observed?

Is it a common phenomenon?

Is it a

thing that is commonly done in marketing properties for
residential purposes?
A.

Have you done it?

Yes. And I think it's essential to do in some

instances to realize the highest and best use of property.
frequently done in putting together packages for commercial
constructionf or for residential construction as in my
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It's

experience.
Q.

And isn't it just as simple as going to the

individuals who own the served or segregated title and showing
them the economics of an assemblage and establishing, I mean
showing them in their minds that it's the best of use that they
can put to are their property?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that relates to the highest and best use, does

A.

It does.

Q.

Did you make an investigation concerning assemblage

it not?

of the Springer, the Lind property, with other properties?
A.

I did.

Q.

What investigation did you make?

A.

May I step down, Your Honor?
THE COURT:

Sure.

[WITNESS RESPONDED]
WITNESS: A.

I previously testified that the Lind

and Springer properties—
[INDICATED]
—were part of a roughly 20-acre tract, located west of what is
now Plat-J and that that tract, as a whole, was suitable for
residential development.

The ownerships, in my investigation,

revealed the ownership by Lind, and then between Lind and
Springer by Krofts.

Mr. Lind already testified that he had an
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agreement with Krofts to join together in an effort t o —
MR. WARD:

Your Honor, I would object to that.

I

don't remember hearing that at all.
MR. CHAMBERLAIN:
MR. WARD:

Yeah.

He did.

He said that.

Well, let's see the agreement, then.

Let's see the agreement.

The best evidence would be the agree-

ment itself, Your Honor.

Let's see it.

THE COURT:

I really don't remember it.

Do you

have an agreement?
WITNESS:

A.

No, Your Honor.

His testimony in

conjunction with the EXHIBIT NO. 36, the plat, that it contemplated a joint development with the Krofts.
MR. WARD:

Your Honor, that was drawn merely to

show how property might be developed.

There's no agreement

attached to that.
THE COURT:

Well, the objection is sustained.

I

don't remember that.
MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

Well, it's either in the record

or it isn't.
THE COURT: As I remember that, that was how he
would get down to his property.
MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

That's how I remember it.
I'm sorry.

You're right, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

The objection is sustained.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

Q.
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What other investigation did

you make concerning the principal of assemblage?
A.

Mr. Lind's property.

Then there was the Krofts

property, and at least my investigation and on which I premised
my opinion was that Krofts were agreeable to the assemblage
concept.
MR. WARD:

Objection, Your Honor.

How could he

tell what Krofts may or may not be willing to do, Your Honor?
It's hearsay.
MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

I think it falls into the same

category a s —
THE COURT:
grant that.

Well, I don't think he can, either. I

But I think what he's trying to do is say there's a

possibility of development in a particular way that could have
taken place, and I believe that's all you're getting to."
[Emphasis added]
The foregoing opinions were contrary to law,
speculative and totally without foundation.
The Utah Supreme Court has spoken directly to the issue
of projected use as it relates to the value of property in a
condemnation action.

The court stated that the projected use

must be more than possible, it must be reasonably probable and go
beyond the realm of mere speculation of what might happen
sometime in the unknown future.

State v. Jacobs, 16 Utah 2d 167,

397 P.2d 463 (1964).
Even though the Jacobs court found that the admission
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of this sort of evidence is within the sound discretion of the
trial judge, the judge in this case allowed the opinion to come
in without any sort of support or foundation, clearly in
opposition to the directives of the Utah Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has given
its direction on the precise issue of this case.

In Olson v.

United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934) the Court affirmed the
admissibility of evidence on the possibility of combining the
condemned parcel with other properties for the highest and best
use.

The Court then stated that if such a combination of

properties is not a reasonably probable occurrence, the evidence
should be excluded as "mere speculation and conjecture", because
courts do not use such things in their search for truth.
U.S. at 257.

292

See also, United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson,

319 U.S. 266 (1942), (affirming the idea that there must be a
reasonable probability of the land combination or else the mere
possibility is too remote and speculative.), United States v.
70.39 Acres of Land, etc., 164 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.Cal. 1958), (the
opinion of an expert will not be heard on the issue of how
probable the combination is; facts are necessary for that
determination).
In the present case, The only way that the Springer
property could ever be used for the development of a subdivision
would be to combine that one acre parcel with the surrounding 19
acres, which Springer does not own.

-33-

Mr. Mclff presented no facts

or agreements to support the possibility of the combinations of
the lands in question•

In fact, he admitted to the court that he

did not have an agreement for the combination of lands.
502)

(Tr.

His entire testimony, therefore, was based on his opinion

as to what might happen sometime in the undetermined future.
Courts have, as a rule, excluded such testimony as speculative,
and the trial judge in this case erred in allowing it to come in.
CONCLUSION
The Defendants-Respondents' argument is fraught with
legal inconsistencies.

There is no legal comparison between the

cases at bar and the Friberg case.

In the Friberg case, a

Complaint was filed, and because of the long delay which occurred
before the case came to trial, and the substantial increase in
land values during this seven year delay, and the fact that the
Defendants reserved their right to challenge the State's right to
condemn and didn't draw down on the money, the Friberg Defendants
were given the later trial date.

None of the foregoing facts

exist in the cases at bar.
The EIS was approved in 1977, but additional approvals
and funding were required.

The actual alignment of the freeway

had to be designed with respect to each landowner involved.

The

final design would not have been available until shortly before
December, 1985. Also, funding would have to occur which did not
take place until December, 1985.

If UDOT is required to purchase

the necessary property as soon as the alignment corridor is
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known, this creates an impossibility for UDOT.

The design with

respect to each individual landowner is not known until there is
a final design.

Also, if UDOT doesn't have the necessary fund-

ing, it cannot commence construction as required by Utah Code
Ann. § 78-34-19 (1987).
If these Defendants-Respondents succeed, it will mean
that every time a condemnation is filed, there will have to be a
second trial to determine the date of valuation.

The Defendants-

Respondents being able to choose the date of valuation as any
time the land values were the highest between when the corridor
is announced and when the case comes to trial.
That if the Defendants-Respondents' property was taken
and/or damaged in 1977, this created a cause of action which the
statute of limitations has run and the Governmental Immunity Act
was not complied with.
The Defendants-Respondents are only entitled to
statutory interest from and after the date this Court granted an
order of occupancy.

The cases cited do not allow interest to run

from the date of valuation.

There is no evidence that either the

Springer or Laygo property owners sought building permits.

The

Springer property had the same highest and best use with or
without the interstate project.

The Laygo property owners did

not even pursue developing the portion of their property that was
not being considered by UDOT for the interstate project.
None of the Defendants-Respondents have raised in any
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pleading filed with this Court and/or the pretrial held in this
case any issue relating to a different valuation date or the date
when the statutory interest should commence to run.

It would be

extremely unjust and "unfair" to require a 1977 date of
valuation.

There is absolutely no statutory basis to require the

Plaintiff to pay statutory interest from the date of valuation.
Finally, the Defendants-Respondents have failed to show
that land values were substantially higher in 1977 than in 198687.

In factf the land values were actually higher in 1982-83

than in 1977.

The most the Defendants-Respondents have shown is

that in 1977 there was a greater demand for lots in the Richfield
area and therefore, the lot absorption rate would have been
greater.
Based upon the foregoing, the dates of valuation in
these cases should be the service of summons and interest should
commence to run only from and after the dates the Court granted
the Plaintiff-Appellant's Orders of Immediate Occupancy.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of August, 1989.
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